The Effect of Taxpayers Attitudes towards the Legal System and Government on Tax Morale (With Reference to Selected Assesses in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) by Babu, N. Kishore & Chariye, Abebe Bayu
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.1, 2015 
 
321 
The Effect of Taxpayers Attitudes towards the Legal System and 
Government on Tax Morale 
(With Reference to Selected Assesses in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) 
 
Professor N. Kishore Babu (PhD) 
Department of Commerce and Management Studies Andhra University India 
E-mail: dr.n.kishorebabu@gmail.com 
 
Abebe Bayu Chariye 
Lecturer, College of Business and Economics, Bahir Dar University Ethiopia 
Email: drabebebayu@gmail.com 
 
Abstract  
The overall purpose of this study was to assess the effect of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the legal system and 
government on tax morale. The researchers used survey method for the study. Data for the survey study were 
collected from the target populations by means of self administered questionnaire. From the populations the 
sample was select by using stratified sampling to obtain a representative sample from taxpayers of business 
organization. An ordered probit model is employed to analyze the effect of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the legal 
system and government on tax morale. The results showed that tax morale (dependent variable) is correlated at 
0.4982 with attitude of taxpayers towards government and legal system at 5 percent significance level and there 
is a significant relationship between taxpayer attitude towards the legal system and government, and tax morale 
at a p value of 0.001 and 0.000 and has a significant positive effect on tax morale, with higher marginal effects. 
They have a statistically significant positive effect on tax morale. Therefore, governance quality seems to be a 
key component in the understanding of tax morale. Hence, governments are called to create confidence in their 
credibility and their capacity to deliver promised returns for taxes. The government should build trustworthy 
institutions; much weight should be put on developing a trustworthy ground so that taxpayers feel comfortable 
with paying taxes. 
Keywords: Tax morale, Legal System, Government.  
 
1. Introduction 
Governments establish tax authorities which handle a tax issues as per the country law. Every tax authority of 
each country wishes the taxpayers to comply with the underlying tax laws. Even if one begins from a position 
that government should be small, high tax compliance is necessary for efficiency and equity as well as for 
development of social capital (Slemrod, 1998). However, one of the more vexing problems for every tax 
authority is how to encourage high level of tax compliance with the laws. 
Many researchers have stressed that tax morale, seen as the individuals’ willingness to pay taxes or, 
the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes or an attitude towards paying tax, or in other words, the moral obligation to 
pay taxes or the belief in contributing to the society by paying taxes, is a key instrument that helps to explain tax 
compliance (Frey and Torgler, 2004). Further, Torgler (2001) stated that tax morale can help to explain the high 
degree of tax compliance. So that, when the tax morale is high, tax compliance will be relatively high, too. Erard 
and Feinstein (1994) stress the relevance of integrating moral sentiments into the models to provide a reasonable 
explanation of actual compliance behavior. 
Tax morale has many features which are influenced by a variety of aspects. Various studies identified 
various factors that affect tax morale. For example, Torgler and Schaffner (2007) identified factors such as: the 
tax authority, tax system, compliance perceptions, trust in officials, and the willingness to obey having a 
relatively strong impact on tax morale. On the other hand, they found insignificant relationship between tax 
morale and taxpayers tax awareness. Sum Sam (2005) showed the impact of factors including government 
performance, the legal system, freedom and democracy, the tax authority, and the tax system on the tax morale 
of taxpayers. Thus, it is important to test the effect of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the legal system and 
government on tax morale in developing and transitions countries like Ethiopia as it gets little emphasis and also 
it would be interesting to check the robustness of these results in developing countries where noncompliance and 
tax morale seem to be real problems (Torgler 2003, Alm et al, 2007). Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to 
show the effect of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the legal system and government on tax morale in Addis Ababa 
city administration by taking some sample from business tax payers. 
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2.  Literature Review 
2.1 Attitude towards government and legal system  
Positive actions by the state are intended to increase taxpayers’ positive attitudes and commitment to the tax 
system and tax-payment and thus compliant behavior (Smith 1992). If the government acts in a trustworthy 
fashion, taxpayers might be more willing to comply with the taxes. On the other hand, perceived unfairness 
increases the incentive to act against the tax law as psychological costs are reduced (Torgler, 2004). Attitudes 
towards the government may affect the taxpayer’s normative commitment to comply with law (Levi, 1988). On 
the other hand, (Fjeldstad, 2004) citizens’ willingness to pay taxes voluntarily rests on the local government’s 
capacity to provide services and its demonstrated readiness to secure the compliance of the otherwise non-
compliant. 
A major focus in tax morale research is on perceived trust in state functioning or public finance. The 
intuition is obvious: taxpayers who trust their government and believe that tax revenue is spent properly should 
be more willing to pay taxes. In contrast, tax morale decreases as people believe that tax money is spent 
redundantly—a notion supported by survey research. For example, Slemrod (2003) and Frey and Torgler (2007) 
use data for Europe and find significant and positive effects of different “trust in state” variables on tax morale. 
Their results are confirmed for other countries and cultures, such as Spain (Alm and Gomez 2008), Asia (Torgler 
2004), Latin America (Torgler 2005) and Russia (Alm et al. 2006). 
Torgler, B. (2004) noted that trust in the legal system, the government, the parliament and the national 
officers has a strong impact on tax morale.  A government based on a well functioning democracy produces 
more trust than a dictatorship. A lack of public trust could undermine state revenues and thus the government’s 
ability to perform its function. Taxes can be seen as a price paid for government’s positive actions. Thus, if 
taxpayers trust the public officials, they are more willing to be honest. If the government acts trustworthily, 
taxpayers might be more willing to comply with the taxes. Similar to the tax administration, the relationship 
between taxpayers and government can be seen as a relational contract or psychological contract, which involves 
strong emotional ties and loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained by positive actions, 
based on trust. If the government tries to generate trust with well functioning institutions, co-operation can be 
initiated or increased. Furthermore, when taxpayers are satisfied with the way they are treated, the co-operation 
is enhanced. 
Torgler’s (2003) study of Tax Morale in Switzerland found that individuals trusting the government 
and the legal system also had higher levels of Tax Morale. Moreover, the more extensive the forms of direct 
democracy participation available the higher the individual’s motivation towards complying with his/her taxes, 
which may be interpreted as it is fair for governments to let individuals decide directly what they want the 
government to do. On the other hand, if a government is perceived as corrupt, taxpayers will not trust it become 
more inclined towards evading their taxes (Cummings et al., 2004). Using survey data from the U.S., Botswana, 
and South Africa, the authors found that individuals trusting the legal system, the government, and national 
officers were more likely to have higher Tax Morale. 
Torgler, B. (2004).in his conclusion he boldly say that, an increasing individuals’ trust in the legal 
system, the justice and the government has a significantly positive effect on tax morale. Tax morale depends on 
how satisfied taxpayers are with their national officers and the political system. A higher satisfaction in both 
cases is significantly correlated with higher tax morale. 
Based on studies in Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, trust in the legal system, government, or 
parliament; national pride; and pro-democratic attitudes all have a positive effect on tax morale and support the 
finding that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher tax morale(Torgler, B. and F. Schneider, 
2007). 
According to Everest-Phillip and Sandall (2009) the public perception of government accountability 
can influence of tax morale and tacitly, voluntary compliance. Both authors argued that through payment of 
taxes the government is able to meet its obligations to the people. It follows therefore that how government goes 
about in fulfilling these obligations should matter to the taxpayers because they provide the finance for its 
sustenance. As a result, governance affairs may have either positive or negative influence on the tax morale of 
taxpayers. 
If the state creates institutional settings in which trust between government and citizens is improved, 
for example, giving taxpayers the possibility to actively participate in the political process, higher tax morale can 
be generated. If taxpayers perceive that their interests and preferences are represented properly by political 
institutions and they receive an increased supply of public goods, their willingness to contribute increases. 
Alternatively, if corruption is rampant, citizens have little incentive to cooperate with the state. A more 
encompassing and legitimate state may be an essential precondition for a higher level of tax morale. (Bruno S. 
Frey &Benno Torgler 2007) 
Taxes are the price paid for government services and taxpayers generally are sensitive to the way the 
government uses tax revenues.  Taxpayers perceive their relationship with the state not only as a relationship of 
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coercion, but also as one of exchange. Individuals will feel cheated if taxes are not spent efficiently Ronald G. 
Cummings, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael McKee, and Benno Torgler (2006). Therefore, transparency of the 
usage of taxpayer’s money, trust for the government (Bergman 2002; Torgler 2003), and fairness of the tax 
system (Taylor 2003) are the main political factors, which influence the willingness of a taxpayer to pay taxes. 
Moreover, Ronald G.et (2005) identified that Tax compliance is enhanced when individuals view the paying of 
taxes as a fair fiscal exchange.  In such situations compliance is likely to increase, ceteris paribus.  In particular, 
when the services provided by the government are viewed as widely desired and the decisions determining the 
services provided are transparent and fair, compliance is likely to be higher. 
 
3. Research Methods   
3.1 Research objectives and Hypothesis 
Before selecting the research method adopted it is important to see the objective and hypothesis of the research. 
The major objective of this thesis is to assess the effect of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the legal system and 
government on tax morale over the case of selected business organization, in Addis Ababa City Administration.  
Ho: No statistically significant relationships exist between taxpayer attitude towards the legal system and 
government, and tax morale. 
 
3.2 Research approaches 
The inquiry paradigm used in research is generally influenced by a researcher’s ontological and epistemological 
beliefs. These beliefs represent how the researcher views and seeks to understand the world. The two extremely 
contradicting paradigms are post positivism and constructivism. Thus, post positivist researchers normally adopt 
quantitative methods and constructivist researchers adopt qualitative methods. The other paradigm is 
combination of post positivism and constructivism (that is mixed method). Thus the researcher use quantitative 
methods than qualitative methods. This is mainly due to the fact that, quantitative methods enable the researcher 
to use smaller groups of people to make inferences about larger groups that would be prohibitively expensive to 
study (Baarttlletttt, Kottrlliikk, and Hiiggiinss, 2001). Besides, quantitative methods has been selected because 
the methods are essential for analyzing relationship between variables systematically and help to analyze 
questions, which makes this method better than other methods to achieve the objective of the paper. Under 
quantitative method survey method was used.  
 
3.3 Sample Design 
Sampling frame is a complete list of the study population. For this study, the sampling frame was all business 
profit taxpayers in Addis Ababa City Administration. There are 409,077 business profit taxpayers in Addis 
Ababa City Administration as the information gathered from Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority in June 
2013.   
Another point in sample design is the sample size. Yaro Yamani formula is used in determining the population 
size.  
According to Yamani, (1964) n = N/ [1 + (Ne²)]  
Where n = is the sample size  
             N = is the population  
             e = is the error limit (0.05 on the basis of 95% confidence level)  
            Therefore, n = 409,077 /1 + 409,077 (0.05)2  
             n = 409,077 /1023  
             n = 400   
The researchers add hundred (100) in to the sample size acquired by Yaro Yamani formula. Therefore a sample 
size of 500 was feasible from the 409,077 Addis Ababa City Administration business profit taxpayers. Stratified 
random sampling is applied to conduct this research work. 
 
3.4 Unit of Analysis 
Each business taxpayer was considered as an independent entity. Hence the data collection was made at firm 
level. Therefore, enterprises were the unit of analysis for this study. 
 
3.5 Sources of Data  
Primary data collection is necessary when a researcher cannot find the data needed from secondary sources, 
especially when the researcher is interested in primary data about demographic/socioeconomic characteristics, 
attitude/opinion/interest, awareness/knowledge, intentions, motivation and behavior. The study adopted the 
primary sources of data collection by survey research design. 
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3.6 The Survey Instruments 
Data for the survey study were collected from the target populations by means of self administered questionnaire. 
Close ended questionnaires were used so that, the variables can be ranked to measure the degree of their 
agreement or the disagreement of the respondents with the variables can be elicited. In order to measure the 
items, the researcher was used a five point Likert type-scale. (i.e., “Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree 
and strongly agree). 
 
3.7 Validity and Reliability of Instrument 
Table: 3.2     Reliability Statistics 
Variable  Cases     Number    Cronbachs Alpha      Number of Items  
Tax Morale Valid   500 .828 7 
Taxpayers’ attitudes towards the legal 
system and the government 
Valid   500 .925 4 
Source: Field results SPSS computation.  
The Cronbach alpha coefficient of scale stipulated a standard of above 0.70 for reliability test. The reliability 
ratio for this work showed that all the research questions in the questionnaire hang together and have internal 
consistency in solving distress problems.   
 
3.8 Method of data analysis 
An ordered probit model is employed in this section to analyze the effect of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the 
legal system and government on tax morale. An ordered probit model is used to estimate relationships between 
an ordinal dependent variable and a set of independent variables. The models are very useful to analyze 
dependent variables of tax moral containing ordering information. The statistical package for social sciences 
(SPSS) and STATA were employed in the different analyses conducted. 
Model   
  
*
iy  = αO βATGL + ε    
Where:  
*
iy  = Tax Morale (TMOR) 
ATGLA = Attitude of Taxpayers towards Government and Legal system  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Correlations Analysis 
Pearson’s Correlation analysis is used for data to see the relationship between variables such as between tax 
morale and Attitude of Taxpayers towards Government and Legal system  
Table 4.1 Correlation Matrix of tax morale and explanatory variable 
 
                                
This table presents a correlation matrix of tax morale and explanatory variable 
The correlation matrix in Table 4.1 shows that tax morale (dependent variable) is correlated at 0.4982 with 
attitude of taxpayers towards government and legal system at 5 percent significance level. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
For the purpose of identifying the important variables impacting the dependent variable the researcher has used 
the regression analysis. 
For the fact that scaled ranking information of the dependent variables, the researcher use ordered 
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probit estimation.  However, because in ordered probit the estimating equation has a nonlinear form, we can 
interpret directly only the sign of the estimated coefficients and not their size.  The marginal effects need to be 
calculated explicitly they indicate the change in the dependent (or the probability) when the independent variable 
increases by one unit.  In the results both the coefficients and marginal effects are present.  
 
Regression Model: Ordered Probit Model 
Model   
*
iy  = αO βATGL + ε    
In this model, the researcher obtains the following results (presented here exactly as in the STATA output): 
These results are presented in table one and table two. Five predict outcome come under table two. Table one is a 
coefficients from ordered probits are difficult to interpret, Table two gives the marginal effects on the probability 
of assenting and their standard errors for each coefficient. 
 
Table 4.2.1 Ordered Probit Model results 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a five-point scale. In the reference group is (ATGL ): attitude of 
taxpayers towards government and legal system. (Coef): coefficient, (Std.Err): standard error, Significance 
levels: p< 0.05. 
 
 
  
                                                                              
      /cut29     4.545852   .3409453                      3.877612    5.214093
      /cut28     4.341711   .2874408                      3.778337    4.905085
      /cut27     2.626903   .1572415                      2.318716    2.935091
      /cut26     2.419142   .1542067                      2.116902    2.721381
      /cut25     2.189294   .1516976                      1.891972    2.486616
      /cut24     1.917224   .1489173                      1.625352    2.209097
      /cut23     1.651994   .1462849                      1.365281    1.938708
      /cut22     1.377183   .1440521                      1.094847     1.65952
      /cut21     1.148543   .1422373                      .8697629    1.427323
      /cut20     .8509663   .1393778                      .5777909    1.124142
      /cut19     .7000198   .1378471                      .4298445    .9701952
      /cut18     .5603311   .1366421                      .2925174    .8281447
      /cut17      .471566   .1359995                      .2050119    .7381202
      /cut16     .4153164   .1356423                      .1494624    .6811705
      /cut15     .3156021   .1351232                      .0507655    .5804387
      /cut14      .273133   .1349413                       .008653    .5376131
      /cut13     .2512523   .1348565                     -.0130615    .5155661
      /cut12     .2287911   .1347669                     -.0353472    .4929293
      /cut11     .1706401   .1345837                     -.0931392    .4344193
      /cut10     .1221401   .1345121                     -.1414988     .385779
       /cut9     .0971464   .1345045                     -.1664775    .3607703
       /cut8     .0587643   .1345423                     -.2049339    .3224624
       /cut7    -.0353864   .1349116                     -.2998083    .2290355
       /cut6    -.1076571   .1354597                     -.3731531     .157839
       /cut5    -.1536847   .1359217                     -.4200864     .112717
       /cut4    -.2523689   .1372748                     -.5214225    .0166847
       /cut3    -.4443964   .1414881                     -.7217079   -.1670848
       /cut2    -.7917368   .1560564                     -1.097602   -.4858719
       /cut1    -1.043587   .1746177                     -1.385832   -.7013428
                                                                              
       ATGLA     .4767057   .0419836    11.35   0.000     .3944193    .5589921
                                                                              
       TMORA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1371.3078                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0455
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =     130.70
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =        500
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1371.3078  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1371.3079  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1371.4406  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1436.6596  
. oprobit TMORA ATGLA
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Table 4.2.2 Marginal Effects 
 
 
 
The ordered probit model is indicated by Table 4.2.1. The dependent variable is the tax morale and the 
independent variables are Attitude of Taxpayers towards Government and Legal system. The model is 
statistically significant since the probability value of chi-square is less than 0.01.   The researcher use marginal 
effect to explain the dependent variable. Marginal effects provide a more straightforward way to gauge the size 
of the impact of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. 
As we can see from table 4.2.2 above, When attitude of taxpayers towards government and legal system 
increase by one point, -.0031407 percentage points tax payers tax morale less likely to be in strongly disagree 
category, -.0035415 percentage points tax payers tax morale less likely to be in disagree category, -.0013936 
percentage points tax payers tax morale less likely to be in neutral category,    -.0133885 percentage points tax 
payers tax morale less likely to be in agree category and .0484749 percentage points tax payers tax morale more 
likely to be in strongly agree category. An increase in attitude of taxpayers towards government and legal system 
scale by one point increases the share of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by .0484749 percentage 
points. This means that an increase in government and legal system attitudes score increases the predicted 
probability of tax morale and have positive and significant impact on the tax morale of taxpayers. The result is 
consistent with the Torgler, B., M. Schaffner, and A. Macintyre (2010) . Moreover, Torgler’s (2003)  and 
Torgler, B. (2004) boldly conclude that an increasing individuals’ trust in the legal system, the justice and the 
government has a significantly positive effect on tax morale. 
                                                                              
   ATGLA    -.0083226      .00313   -2.66   0.008  -.014449 -.002196    3.0585
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .00618182
      y  = Pr(TMORA==1) (predict, outcome(1))
Marginal effects after oprobit
                                                                              
   ATGLA    -.0065255      .00293   -2.23   0.026  -.012273 -.000778    3.0585
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .00895351
      y  = Pr(TMORA==2) (predict, outcome(2))
Marginal effects after oprobit
. mfx, predict(outcome(2))
                                                                              
   ATGLA     .0930687      .01063    8.76   0.000   .072238    .1139    3.0585
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .11925708
      y  = Pr(TMORA==5) (predict, outcome(5))
Marginal effects after oprobit
. mfx, predict(outcome(5))
                                                                              
   ATGLA    -.0231095      .00477   -4.84   0.000  -.032464 -.013755    3.0585
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .10657241
      y  = Pr(TMORA==4) (predict, outcome(4))
Marginal effects after oprobit
. mfx, predict(outcome(4))
                                                                              
   ATGLA    -.0024342      .00173   -1.41   0.160  -.005827  .000959    3.0585
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .00427035
      y  = Pr(TMORA==3) (predict, outcome(3))
Marginal effects after oprobit
. mfx, predict(outcome(3))
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4.3 Hypotheses Testing 
No statistically significant relationships exist between taxpayer attitude towards the legal system and 
government and tax morale. 
The result presented in table 4.2.2 shows that, there is a significant relationship between taxpayer attitude 
towards the legal system and government, and tax morale at a p value of 0.001 and 0.000 and has a significant 
positive effect on tax morale, with higher marginal effects. By this result, we reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternate. In other words, we accept that there is a statically significant relationship between taxpayer 
attitude towards the legal system and government, and tax morale. They have a statistically significant positive 
effect on tax morale. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation  
The results revealed that there was a significant and positive correlation between taxpayer attitude towards the 
legal system and government, and tax morale in Ethiopia. Taxpayer attitude towards the legal system and 
government have a significant positive effect on tax morale and one of the influencing factors of tax morale. 
Thus, trust seems to be a key determinant to maintain and increase tax morale and thus taxpayers’ willingness to 
contribute to a public good. Governance quality seems to be a key component in the understanding of tax morale. 
Hence, governments are called to create confidence in their credibility and their capacity to deliver promised 
returns for taxes. The government should build trustworthy institutions; much weight should be put on 
developing a trustworthy ground so that taxpayers feel comfortable with paying taxes. 
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